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ABSTRACT 
When first I wrote on the subject in 1974, Second Amendment scholarship was 
almost nonexistent, but the common belief was that the Amendment protected some 
manner of State right to control National Guard units, a belief universally accepted 
in case law at the federal level. 
Thirty-five years later, the picture has radically changed. District of Columbia v. 
Heller,1 established the Second Amendment as an individual right, and McDonald v. 
Chicago,2 held it was a fundamental right incorporated under the 14th Amendment. 
There already are several appellate rulings on its scope, and approximately a dozen 
more test cases on the way. 
This article explores the origins of the two competing theories of the Second 
Amendment – the “individual rights” approach which carried the majority in Heller 
and McDonald, and the variants of a “collective right” theory which was previously 
dominant in the lower courts, and one variant of which was endorsed by the Heller 
dissents. Careful analysis of states’ bills of rights of the Framing period suggests that 
two guarantees were desired, by different political factions. Framers closely adhering 
to the Classical Republican point of view favored protection for the militia as a 
system; those favoring the emerging Jeffersonian point of view favored guarantees 
of individual rights to arms. The Second Amendment has two clauses because it has 
two purposes. 
                                                          
      
1
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
      
2
 McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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This article also suggests that the prior Supreme Court ruling, United States v. 
Miller,3 was almost certainly a collusive case, and that its ambiguity is a product of 
very poor briefing and assignment to the exceptionally lazy Justice McReynolds, 
whom the Chief Justice understandably detested. 
The “collective right” theory, while dominating case law circa 1990, had little 
standing throughout most of our history. It rose to prominence only in the lower 
federal courts beginning in the 1940s, and achieved its dominance only in the 1970s. 
Put in historical context, Heller and McDonald are not so much a dramatic change in 
constitutional interpretation so much as a rejection of a relatively recent trend in the 
lower courts, a trend that was subject to academic criticism even as it took form. 
 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, 
 the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.4 
 
As late as a decade ago, the federal courts’ interpretation of the Second 
Amendment was simple.  Every circuit that had ruled upon it had held that it did not 
guarantee an individual right to arms for individual purposes.  Rather, it reflected 
some form of “collective right,” either (1) a right of states to have militia systems, or 
(2) a right of individuals, but only to engage in state-organized militia activities.5 
Five years later this position had collapsed.  In District of Columbia v. Heller,6 
followed by McDonald v. City of Chicago,7 the Supreme Court accepted the 
individual right for individual purposes view.  More astonishing, the first form of 
“collective rights,” which saw it as a right of States and had prevailed in three 
circuits,8 lost 9-0!9  The circuits quickly turned to determining the parameters of the 
right which they had previously thought nonexistent.10 
                                                          
      
3
 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
      
4
 U.S. CONST. amend. II. (denoting 18th century copyists freely altered punctuation when 
transcribing text thus there are versions with one, two, and three commas). 
 
5
 See, e.g., United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
807 (1997); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1997); Hickman v. Block, 81 
F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom.; Hickman v. City of Los Angeles, 519 U.S. 912 
(1996); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale, 978 
F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984); Quilici v. 
Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); 
United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st 
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943). 
 
6
 Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 
7
 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 
8
 United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here can be no serious 
claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm.”); United States 
v. Scanio, No.  97-1574, 1998 WL 802060, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 1998) (indicating the 
Second Amendment was “meant solely to protect the right of the states to keep and maintain 
armed militia . . . .”); Block, 81 F.3d 98, 101 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Second Amendment is a 
right held by the states, and does not protect the possession of a weapon by a private 
citizen.”). 
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Such a change might be considered “revolutionary” in the modern usage of that 
word.  But when the Second Amendment is placed in historical context, it becomes 
apparent that the change was revolutionary in the original use of the term – a change 
which returns things to the point of their beginning.11  From the framing of the Bill 
of Rights onward, the individual right view (i.e., individual right for individual 
purposes such as self-defense) held sway in every venue – courts, commentators, 
Congress.  The collective right view did not begin to gain acceptance in the federal 
courts until the 1940s, and did not become widespread until the 1970s.  At the time 
of Heller, it was but a few decades old, and had been subject to serious scholarly 
challenge for most of that brief lifespan. 
This article will examine the history of the two competing theories in terms of 
the Framing period, the developments in American law prior to the Civil War,  and 
the understandings of courts, commentators, and Congress following that War.  We 
will then review developments of the Twentieth Century, including the origins of 
collective right interpretation over that period. 
I.  THE AMERICAN RIGHT TO ARMS AS SEEN BY THE FRAMERS AND THEIR 
CONTEMPORARIES 
A.  Background: the Anglo-American Experience 
When conceptualizing the right to arms, early American thought was informed 
by two well-known concepts, one of which focused upon individual ownership of 
arms to implement a core right of self-defense, the other which focused upon a 
universal militia as the only safe defense of a free polity. 
As Joyce Malcolm has extensively documented,12 the English perception of an 
individual right to arms arose out of a 17th century reversal of policy course.13  Prior 
to the Stuart dynasty, English governments actively forced their subjects to own and 
use arms.  All healthy male subjects were required to own arms appropriate to the 
period and their wealth,14 towns were required to construct shooting ranges,15 and all 
                                                          
 
9
 Even the Heller dissenters argued against it: “The question presented by this case is not 
whether the Second Amendment protects a ‘collective right’ or an ‘individual right.’  Surely it 
protects a right that can be enforced by individuals.”  554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
10
 See, e.g., United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 26508 (4th Cir. 
Dec. 30, 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 
1199 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009); In re United 
States, 578 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Engstrom, 609 F. Supp.2d 1227 (D. 
Utah 2009). 
 
11
 See THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS 465 (Iain McLean & Alistair 
McMillan eds., 2003) (“Before 1789, the word often meant, truer to its literal meaning, a 
return to a previous state of affairs . . . .”). 
 
12
 JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
RIGHT  (1994). 
 
13
 Id. at 1, 13-15. 
 
14
 The 1181 Assize of Arms, for instance, required all free men to possess a lance and 
armor.  EUGENE MORROW VIOLETTE ET AL., SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
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games other than marksmanship were outlawed in order to ensure that Englishmen 
would have but one legal sport.16  The arms-bearing populace eventually came to be 
known as the militia, and was organized under royal officials, the Lords Lieutenant. 
Wracked by instability,17 the Stuart kings radically reversed these policies.  Their 
primary legal tools were the Militia Act of 1662, which authorized the Lords 
Lieutenant or their deputies to disarm anyone they might “judge dangerous to the 
peace of the Kingdom,” and the Game Act of 1671, which (under the justification of 
preventing poaching) forbade all but the wealthiest landowners to possess firearms.18  
James II in particular tried to enforce these measures.  One example is a 1686 order 
that informed the Lords Lieutenant that James had heard that “a great many persons 
not qualified by law under pretence of shooting matches keep muskets or other guns 
in their houses,” and ordered them “to cause strict search to be made for such 
muskets or guns and to seize and safely keep them till further order.”19 
James was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, to be succeeded by 
William and Mary.20  Parliament then drafted a Declaration of Rights,21 which the 
new monarchs were required to accept before taking the throne. 
The Declaration was a minimalist guarantee of rights; only the most “ancient and 
indubitable” English rights were spelled out.  Free speech was protected only in 
Parliament; freedoms of the press, of assembly, and of religion were nowhere 
mentioned. But among the core rights protected was that of arms: “the subjects 
which are Protestant may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and 
as allowed by law.”22 
The individual nature of this right was clear, not only from its text, but from its 
history.  The Parliamentary debates had centered upon individual disarmaments 
under the 1662 Militia Act.  Sir Richard Temple referred to “Militia Bill—Power to 
disarm all England—Now done in Ireland,” Mr. Boscawen lodged a personal 
                                                          
HISTORY 23 (George B. Adams & H. M. Stephens eds., 1926) (1901).  The 1285 Statute of 
Winchester extended this duty to all males aged 15-60, including serfs.  Id. at 43, 78-79.  In 
1511, Parliament required all Englishmen aged 7-60 to have and practice with the longbow.  3 
Hen. 8 c. 3, 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 25 (1511). 
 
15
 See An Acte for Maynten’nce of Artillarie and debarringe of unlawful Games, 33 Hen. 
8 c. 9, 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 837, 838 (1541). 
 
16
 Id. See also ALEC R. MYERS, 4 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 1182 (Alec R. Myers 
ed., 1969) (including a 1363 proclamation of Edward III outlawing “throwing stones, wood, or 
iron, playing handball, football, or ‘stick-ball’ . . . or hockey, or cock-fighting . . . ” or any 
other games of this kind, which are worthless). 
 
17
 Charles I was overthrown by the English Civil Wars of 1642-1651 and beheaded in their 
aftermath, while his sons Charles II and James II were driven into exile, returning with the 
Restoration of 1660.  James II in turn was overthrown by the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 
 
18
 14 Car. 2, c. 2 (1662); 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 25 (1671).  See generally P. B. MUNSCHE, 
GENTLEMEN AND POACHERS: THE ENGLISH GAME LAWS 1671-1831 11-14 (1981). 
 
19
 2 JAMES II, CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS DOMESTIC SERIES 314 (London 1686). 
 
20
 Mary being his daughter and William his son-in-law.  Dysfunctional families are not a 
modern concept. 
 
21
 1 W. & M., c. 2 (1689). 
 
22
 Id. 
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complaint, “Militia—Imprisoning without reason; disarming—Himself disarmed . . 
.” and Sergeant (then a legal rank) added “Militia Act—An abominable thing to 
disarm the nation . . . .”23  Early drafts, which would have focused upon the keeping 
and providing of arms “for the common defense” were dropped in favor of an 
individual right guarantee.24  Thus one modern English military historian’s complaint 
that: “The original working implied that everyone had a duty to be ready to appear in 
arms whenever the state was threatened. The revised wording suggested only that it 
was lawful to keep a blunderbuss to repel burglars.”25 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, the foremost explanation of law available to the 
Framing generation, explained this in individualist terms: 
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall at present 
mention, is that of having arms for their defense, suitable to their 
condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also 
declared by the same statute, 1 W. and M. St. 2, c. 2 [the Declaration of 
Rights], and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the 
natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of 
society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of 
oppression. 
 
In these several articles consist the rights, or as they are frequently 
termed, the liberties of Englishmen . . . .26 
It is thus not surprising that when, prior to the Revolution, the British complained 
of Americans’ stockpiling of arms, Sam Adams published a response: “It is a natural 
right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of Rights, 
to keep arms for their own defence; and as Mr. Blackstone observes, it is to be made 
use of when the sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to restrain the 
violence of oppression.”27 
The other component of the legal background was the American militia systems.  
From their beginning, the colonies had required all adult males (and sometimes adult 
females, if heads of households)28 to possess arms.  In an echo of the modern 
                                                          
 
23
 2 PHILLIP YORKE, MISCELLANEOUS STATE PAPERS FROM 1501 TO 1726 416-17 (Phillip 
Yorke ed., London 1778).  Hardwick found the penciled notes of Lord Somers, covering the 
debate in the House of Commons. 
 
24
 See MALCOLM, supra note 12, at 119. 
 
25
 Id. 
 
26
 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 143-44 (J.B. 
Lippincott Co. 1893). 
 
27
 OLIVER DICKERSON, BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE 79 (1936) (reprinting the article as 
it appeared in THE NEW YORK JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT). 
 
28
 See CLAYTON E. CRAMER, ARMED AMERICA 4, 7  (2006). 
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“unorganized militia,”29 some statutes exempted critical occupations from militia 
training, yet still required those persons to own arms.30 
In a world faced with attacks by Native Americans and by rival French, Spanish, 
and Dutch colonists, the militia concept was a practical one.  It acquired intellectual 
underpinnings from the writings of the English Classical Republican authors, such as 
Roger Molesworth, James Harrington, and James Burgh.31  These argued that a 
universal militia was the only safe and effective defense of a free people: A 
professional army must either be too weak to defend a free people, or powerful 
enough to take over the government and private property.  A militia composed of 
voters and property owners could be as powerful as desired, yet pose no risk to 
government or property, since its members were the very ones who controlled both. 
The Framing generation thus acted against a dual legal background, both 
components of which linked individual arms ownership to freedom.  One component 
stressed the right to have arms, as a means of individual self-defense; the other 
stressed the duty to have arms, as a means of collective self-defense.  It is not 
surprising that when, following the Declaration of Independence, the new States 
drafted bills of rights, provisions on arms took two different courses, which only 
became merged late in the period. 
B.  Understanding of the Framing Period 
1.  Framing Period Evidence for an Individual Rights Understanding 
a.  Evidence of Separate Origins for the Amendment’s Clauses 
During the Heller oral argument, Justice Kennedy advanced a theory that the 
Second Amendment’s two clauses had two independent purposes: 
 
[I]t seems to me that there is an interpretation of the Second Amendment 
differing from that of the district court and in Miller and not advanced 
particularly in the red [Respondent’s] brief, but that conforms the two 
clauses and in effect delinks them. 
 
The first clause I submit can be read consistently with the purpose I've 
indicated of simply reaffirming the existence and the importance of the 
militia clauses. 
                                                          
 
29
 See 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006). 
 
30
 See Robert A. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Bear Arms 
in Early America, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 145, 148, 166 (2007); Militia Act of 1792, §§ 1-
2, 1 Stat. 271-72. 
 
31
 See FRANCIS HOTOMAN, FRANCO-GALLIA iv (Roger Molesworth trans., London 1711); 
THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 442 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1977); 2 JAMES 
BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS: AN ENQUIREY INTO PUBLIC ERRORS, DEFECTS AND ABUSES 
345, 390, 474-76 (London 1774) (reprint 1971). These authors, and especially Burgh, carried 
great influence among Americans of the Framing period. See generally Robert E. Shalhope, 
The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 127-29 (1986); 
David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second 
Amendment, 9 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 586-87 (1986). 
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Those were very important clauses.  As you've indicated, they're in 
Article I and Article II. 
 
And so in effect the amendment says we reaffirm the right to have a 
militia, we've established it, but in addition, there is a right to bear arms.32 
The historical record supports Justice Kennedy’s theory.  The Bill of Rights 
originated as a Federalist attempt to appease, or neutralize, critics of the original 
Constitution, who feared that the new government would abuse its powers.33  The 
Second Amendment has two clauses, because it had a dual ancestry and was 
intended to appease two different concerns.  The first concern rose directly from 
Classical Republican thought: of all defenses for a republic, only a militia composed 
of land-owning voters could be both strong and safe.  The second concern’s origins 
came from what would later be known as Jeffersonianism, and centered upon 
guarantees of rights, including an individual right to arms. 
At the outset, framers of American constitutions treated the two as a binary 
choice; only very late in the process did they realize that both could be combined.  
The comparative influence of Classical Republicanism and Jeffersonianism can be 
illustrated by comparing a body’s militia vs. arms choice to its decisions relating to 
another tenet of Classical Republicanism – that voters should be landowners – and of 
Jeffersonianism – universal manhood suffrage. 
 
Virginia, 1776.  The two approaches appeared at the very outset, as Virginia 
drafted the first State constitution and declaration of rights. The framers were 
presented with two approaches. 
 
Thomas Jefferson’s proposal 
                                                          
 
32
 District of Columbia v. Heller – Oral Argument, The Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent 
College of Law, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_ 
290/argument (emphasis added) (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).  Justice Scalia then took a related 
approach: 
  I don't see how there's any, any, any contradiction between reading the second 
clause as a . . . as a personal guarantee and reading the first one as assuring the 
existence of a militia, not necessarily a State-managed militia because the militia that 
resisted the British was not State-managed. 
 
  But why isn't it perfectly plausible, indeed reasonable, to assume that since the 
framers knew that the way militias were destroyed by tyrants in the past was not by 
passing a law against militias, but by taking away the people's weapons . . . that was 
the way militias were destroyed. 
 
  The two clauses go together beautifully: Since we need a militia, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 
Id. 
 
33
 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 30-39 (1999). 
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Guarantee:  “No freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms.”34 
Franchise: All residents.35 
 
George Mason’s (successful) proposal 
Guarantee: “That a well-regulated militia, or composed of the body of the people, 
trained to arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free state . . . .”36  
Franchise: Landowners.37 
 
Pennsylvania, 1776.  The Virginia Declaration was quickly followed by that of 
Pennsylvania, where “radical” forces had stage a political coup.38  The 
Pennsylvanians borrowed heavily from the Virginia measure, but made one major 
change. 
 
Guarantee: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves and the state.”39 
Franchise: All taxpayers.40 
 
Maryland, 1776.  
Guarantee: “That a well-regulated militia is the proper and natural defence of a 
free government.”41 
Franchise: Freeholders with 50 acres of land, or 30 pounds of property.42 
                                                          
 
34
 1 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 344 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). Jefferson’s draft adds 
“[within his own lands or tenements],” the brackets indicating that he was either considering 
adding, or considering deleting, this phrase. 
 
35
 In a letter to Edmund Pendleton, dated August 26, 1776, Jefferson explained, “I was for 
extending the right of suffrage (or in other words the right of a citizen) to all who had a 
permanent intention of living in the country . . . . Whoever intends to live in a country must 
wish that country well . . . .” 
 
36
 Virginia Declaration of Rights § 13 (1776), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/bcp/virg_dor.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). The inclusion of the 
word “safe” highlights the Classical Republican understanding that the militia was the only 
defensive system that could be both effective as to enemies and safe from the standpoint of a 
free State. 
 
37
 The franchise had long been limited to landowners.  An act for prevention of undue 
election of Burgeses, 3 Henings’ Laws of Virginia 173 (1699), and Mason’s draft left this in 
place. 
 
38
 See generally Samuel B. Harding, Party Struggles Over The First Pennsylvania 
Constitution, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 
1894 371 (1895). 
 
39
 5 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR 
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3082-83 (1909). 
 
40
 Id. 
 
41
 MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS  § XXV, available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/md-
1776.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 
42
  MD. CONST. § II, available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/md-1776.htm (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
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Vermont, 1777. 
Guarantee: “That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves and the State; and, as standing armies, in the time of peace, are 
dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military should be 
kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.”43 
Franchise: All freemen.44 
 
Massachusetts, 1780. 
Guarantee: “The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common 
defence.”45 
Franchise: Freehold worth three pounds, or property worth sixty, for the lower 
house; freehold worth sixty pounds, for the upper.46 
 
Kentucky, 1792. 
Guarantee: “The rights of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and 
the State shall not be questioned.”47 
Franchise: All free males.48 
 
Framers of the early state constitutions thus appear to have seen a binary choice 
between praising the militia or guaranteeing an individual right to arms, and the 
choice largely parallels their choice between the Classical Republican belief that 
only property owners should vote and the Jeffersonian ideal of universal manhood 
suffrage.  There are two sets of concerns being expressed here, backed by two 
somewhat different political philosophies. 
The debates over the ratification of the proposed Constitution begat the 
movement for an American bill of rights.  The earliest proposals still regarded 
matters as a binary choice, and uniformly went with the individual right to arms 
rather than a militia clause.  Thus the publicized report of the minority of the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention49 called for: 
[T]he people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and 
their own state, or the United States, or the purpose of killing game; and 
                                                          
 
43
  VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XV, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vt01.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 
44
  VT. CONST. § XVI, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vt01.asp. 
 
45
 MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XVII, available at 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 
46
 MASS. CONST. ch. 1, art. II, ch. 3, art. IV, available at 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 
47
  KY. CONST. art. XII, § 23, available at http://courts.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/7471028C-
8BCC-41A2-BA80-02013D4FA550/0/1stKYConstitution.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2011). 
 
48
 Id. at art. III, § 1. 
 
49
 The merchant class had eventually returned to power. 
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no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for 
crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals . . . .50  
The next demand came in Massachusetts, where Samuel Adams unsuccessfully 
proposed a guarantee “that the said constitution be never construed to authorize 
Congress . . . to prevent the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens, 
from keeping their own arms . . . .”51 When New Hampshire gave the Constitution 
the ninth vote necessary for ratification, it requested the guarantee that “Congress 
shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual 
Rebellion.”52  
Then came the Virginia ratifying convention, and the breakthrough.  The 
Virginians realized that the militia/right to arms choice was a false dichotomy.  If 
those who wanted a right to arms were also in favor of the militia system, and those 
who preferred a militia guarantee also believed in a right to arms, why not 
incorporate both?  The Virginia ratifiers thus proposed a guarantee that was the 
direct ancestor of the Second Amendment: “That the people have a right to keep and 
bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained 
to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state . . . .”53  The Virginia 
formulation became instantly popular among the few remaining State conventions.  
New York (which ratified) and North Carolina (which did not) accepted it with but a 
minor change in wording.54 
The Framers and their contemporaries understood that the future Second 
Amendment had dual roots.  One portion related to rights, arising from individual 
self defense, the other related to duties, arising from needs for social self defense. As 
there was no conflict between the two, it made sense to put both in writing.  
Omitting praise for the militia might alienate constitutional critics such as George 
Mason; omitting an individual right to arms would alienate others, such as the 
Pennsylvania minority and New Hampshire majority.  “Either/or” was resolved by 
“and.” 
                                                          
 
50
 2 MADISON STATE HISTORICAL SOC’Y OF WIS., THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 597-98 (Merrill Jensen ed., Wisconsin, Worzalla 
Publishing Company, 1796).  The minority’s proposals were met with criticism based on the 
argument that the new national government would have no power over individual arms 
ownership, so that its provisions would be superfluous.  See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of 
the People or the Power of the State: Bearing Arms, Arming Militias, and the Second 
Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131, 150 (1991). 
 
51
 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 86-87 (Boston 1856).  See also PAUL LEWIS, THE GRAND INCENDIARY: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF SAMUEL ADAMS 361 (1973); 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 675 (Leon Friedman et al. eds.,1971). 
 
52
 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 761.  See generally, JOSEPH BURBEEN WALKER, BIRTH 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE CONVENTION (Boston, 
Supples & Sound, Publishers, 1888). 
 
53
 2  SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 842. 
 
54
 Id. at 912 (“including the body of the people” rather than “composed of the body of the 
people”). 
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b.  The Drafting of the Second Amendment 
Madison’s understanding came into play when he began work on a national bill 
of rights.  Madison’s arms-related amendment would indeed praise the militia and 
guarantee a right to arms, but he appears to have placed greater weight on the latter 
provision.  First, we have his handwritten outline for a speech introducing his bill of 
rights, a portion of which lists the inadequacies of the English Declaration of Rights, 
including its guarantee of arms rights to protestants only: 
 
fallacy on both sides—especy as to English Decln. of Rts.— 
1. mere act of parlt. 
2. no freedom of press—Conscience 
    Gl. Warrants—Habs. corpus 
    jury in Civil Causes—criml. 
    attainders—arms to Protestts.55 
 
A second indication lies in Madison’s original format for the bill of rights.  
Today we are accustomed to a Bill of Rights which has ten numbered “stand alone” 
provisions.  Madison’s draft, as introduced in Congress, envisioned the amendments 
being inserted in the body of the Constitution, and designated where each portion 
would so be placed.56 Thus— 
 
His first two provisions, which dealt with Congressional apportionment 
and compensation (and failed of ratification) were to be placed in Article 
I, sections two and six, which dealt with representation in the House and 
with compensation of House members; 
 
Provisions which would become the First through Sixth, and Ninth, 
Amendments were to be placed at “Article 1st, Section 9, between 
Clauses 3 and 4” – following the original Constitution’s restrictions on 
enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. 
 
An unsuccessful attempt to restrict State infringements of religious 
liberty, freedom of the press, or the right to criminal jury trial was inserted 
in Article I, section 10, alongside the original Constitution’s restriction of 
State powers. 
 
Provisions relating to appeals, jury trial, and indictment, were to be 
inserted in Article III, which had dealt with the Judiciary. 
 
                                                          
 
55
 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 193-94 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979). 
 
56
 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 201 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). 
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A provision on separation of powers, and the future Tenth Amendment, 
would become a new Article VII, with the existing Article VII 
renumbered as Article VIII. 
 
Madison did not designate the future Second Amendment as a modification of 
Article I, section 8’s establishment of Congressional power over the militia.  Instead 
he grouped it with the future first six amendments as restrictions on Congressional 
legislative power contained in Article I, section 9.  The Committee of Eleven, to 
whom Madison’s proposals were assigned, kept his organization.57  
There is strong evidence that others – in particular, members of the First 
Congress – shared this understanding.  The First Senate voted down two proposed 
additions to the Bill of Rights.  The first would have appended “for the common 
defense” to the right to keep and bear arms.58  The Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780 had included such a phrase in its right to arms clause, but the inclusion had 
generated controversy and criticism in town meetings.59 
The second would have given states additional militia powers, authorizing them 
to arm and organize the militia should Congress neglect to do so.60  This likewise 
failed on a voice vote.61  The First Congress thus rejected both the attempt to narrow 
and by inference militia-link the right to arms, and the attempt to constitutionalize 
State power over the militia. 
Others of the Framing generation likewise stressed the individual right aspect of 
the Second Amendment.  Even while the Bill of Rights was being debated, 
Madison’s friend Tench Coxe published a series of newspaper articles explaining it, 
which is known to have been carried by papers in Boston, New York, and 
Philadelphia.62  His explanation of the Second Amendment gave not a word to the 
well-regulated militia, but assured Americans that: 
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may 
attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be 
occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to the 
injury of their fellow-citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article 
in their right to keep and bear their private arms.63 
                                                          
 
57
 5 THE DEP’T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 1786-1870 186-87 (1905).  See also Robert E. Shalhope, The Second 
Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. OF AM. HIST. 587, 589 (1984). 
 
58
 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (1820) (“On 
motion to amend article the fifth, by inserting these words: ‘for the common defense’ next to 
the words ‘to bear arms’: it passed in the negative.”). 
 
59
 See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the First State Bills of Rights: 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, VT. L. REV. 255, 302-304 
(1985). 
 
60
 Id. at 75. 
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 77 n.152 (2d ed. 1994).  
 
63
 See id. at 76-77.  
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Coxe sent a copy to Madison, who complimented him on it, noting that the article 
was already in the newspapers  in New York, where the First Congress was sitting.64 
In short, the Second Amendment had dual points of origin, and was meant to 
appeal to two different political groups.  James Madison and the First Congress kept 
the two concepts independent, and tended to treat the right to arms as if it were the 
predominant clause. 
2.  Framing Period Evidence for a Militia-Uses-Only Right to Arms 
While there were mentions of the militia in the ratification debates, most are 
useless to our present inquiry.  References to the militia’s perceived importance 
merely state what is already obvious from the first clause of the Second Amendment.  
Concerns that Congress might create a select, handpicked militia,65 or worries that 
Congress would make militia service too burdensome so as to sabotage the system66 
likewise shed no light at all on whether the right to arms was seen as limited to 
militia service. 
The Stevens dissent in Heller sees the Second Amendment as motivated by fears 
that the new national government might “disarm the state militias” (i.e., by failing to 
provide arms or mandate their purchase) thereby threatening “the sovereignty of the 
several States.”67  The dissent quotes George Mason in the Virginia ratifying 
convention, concerned that “Congress may neglect to provide for arming and 
disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Congress has the 
exclusive right to arm them.”68  Since the Virginia Convention ended with a call for 
a bill of rights that included an obvious ancestor of the Second Amendment (“the 
people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of 
the body of the people trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a 
free state . . . .”),69 the dissent suggests that this proposal, and thus the Second 
Amendment, was meant to meet Mason’s desire to protect State rights to arm their 
militias. 
A simple timeline shows, however, that Mason’s concerns did not underlie the 
Second Amendment ancestor, but rather a different proposal which was added to the 
Virginia demands after he gave the above speech, and which failed to be accepted by 
the First Congress.  That different proposal read: “That each state respectively shall 
have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining its own militia, 
whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the same . . . .”70 
                                                          
 
64
 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 55, at 239-41, 257. 
 
65
 See, e.g., LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 21-22, 124 (Walter 
Hartwell Bennett ed., 1978); 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 50, at 509; 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 55, at 
378. 
 
66
 See, e.g., Patrick Henry’s argument that Congress might require one type of militia 
musket, and the States another: “But can the people afford to pay for double sets of arms?”  1 
JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 386 (2d ed. 1836). 
 
67
 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
68
 Id. at 639. 
 
69
 Id. 
 
70
 3 ELLIOT, supra note 66, at 660. 
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The Virginians were capable of clearly addressing a problem, and did so here.  This 
becomes even clearer when we examine a timetable: 
 
June 11, 1788: The Virginia Ratifying Convention considers a draft of a 
bill of rights, containing the ancestor of the Second Amendment: “The 
people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia, 
composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper natural 
and safe defense of a free State . . . .”71  This draft said nothing about State 
powers to arm militias. 
 
June 14, 1788: George Mason realizes there is an unaddressed problem 
with regard to the militia, and tells the Convention it needs a remedy.  
Congress might “neglect to arm them [the militia], and prescribe proper 
discipline.”   He moves for a guarantee: “I wish, that in case the general 
government should neglect to arm and discipline the militia, that there 
should be an express declaration, that state governments might arm and 
discipline them.”72  
 
June 27, 1788: The Virginia convention ratifies the proposed constitution, 
keeping the ancestor of the Second Amendment, and adding to the 
proposed amendments a new provisio: “11th.  That each state respectively 
shall have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining 
its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for 
the same . . . .”73 
 
It is apparent from this sequence that the Virginians did not see their proto-
Second Amendment as protecting state rights to arm militias; not one delegate 
argued that the June 27 proposal was unnecessary since it was covered by the 
existing “right of the people to keep and bear arms” guarantee.  The militia concerns 
were addressed by a separate proviso, which went nowhere.  Madison did not 
include it in the bill of rights he introduced in the First Congress,  and when 
members of the First Senate proposed to add it, the motion lost on a voice vote.74 
Conclusion. In the Framing period, there is strong evidence of an intent to 
recognize an individual right to arms that is independent of militia service.  This is 
borne out by the common law background, Madison’s reference to the English Bill 
of Rights, his original placement of the Second Amendment, Tench Coxe’s 
description of it, and the First Senate’s rejection of a proposal to allow States to arm 
                                                          
 
71
 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 1725-1792 1054, 1068 (Robert A. Rutland, ed., 1970) 
(hereinafter GEORGE MASON PAPERS). 
 
72
 See id. at 1075. 
 
73
 3 ELLIOT, supra note 66, at 660. 
 
74
 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 58, at 
75.  
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their militias.  There is also strong evidence of an intent to commemorate the 
importance of the militia system to freedom and security.  There is, however, no 
evidence of any understanding that the right to arms was restricted to militia service. 
II.  THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE RIGHT TO ARMS IN EARLY AMERICAN LAW 
Here, there are two sets of information to be considered – the writings of early 
legal commentators, and early State case law. 
A.  Writings of Early Legal Commentators 
1.  Evidence from Early Commentators Supporting an Individual Right to Arms 
a.  St. George Tucker 
St. George Tucker, professor of law at William and Mary, was a friend of 
Madison, and had friends and relatives in the First Congress.75  His 1803 edition of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries was the first version of that text annotated with 
American decisions, and remained for two decades the legal treatise most often cited 
by the Supreme Court.76  Tucker dropped a footnote to Blackstone’s description of 
the British Declaration of Rights, noting “The right of the people to keep and bear 
arms shall not be infringed. Amendments to C., U.S., Art. 4, and this without any 
qualification to their condition or degree, as is the case in the British government.”77  
(The Bill of Rights as sent out for ratification had twelve amendments, with today’s 
Second Amendment in fourth place.)  In an appendix volume, Tucker returned to one 
of his favorite themes, American legal exceptionalism: 
The right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it 
has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest 
limits possible.  Wherever standing armies are kept-up, and the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext 
whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink 
of destruction.  In England, the people have been disarmed, generally, 
under the specious pretext of preserving the game: a never failing lure to 
bring over the landed aristocracy to support any measure . . . .78 
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 Jefferson described Tucker as one of his “earliest and best friends, and acquaintances,” 
while Madison appointed him to the federal bench.  His brother served in the First Senate, and 
his closest friend in the First House.  HARDY, supra note 31, at 611-12.  
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 WILLIAM HAMILTON BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979 682 (1982). 
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 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS 143 n.40 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham 
Small 1803). 
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 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS app. at 300 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham 
Small 1803). 
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Tucker’s views of the Amendment are clearly individualistic.  It is linked to self-
defense, and was violated by England’s Game Acts, which had nothing at all to do 
with its militia.79 
b.  William Rawle 
William Rawle was another contemporaneous commentator – indeed, he sat in 
the Pennsylvania Assembly when it ratified the Second Amendment.80  Rawle’s 
1825 View of the Constitution was a popular college text in the early Republic.81 
Rawle gave consideration to both clauses of the Second Amendment. With 
regard to the well-regulated militia clause, Rawle discussed the dangers of standing 
armies and of undisciplined militias, concluding: “The duty of the state government 
is, to adopt such regulations as will tend to make good soldiers with the least 
interruption of the ordinary and useful occupations of civilian life.”82 
He then recognized the independent meaning of the right to keep and bear arms 
clause: “The corollary, from the first position is, that the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms shall not be infringed.  The prohibition is general.  No clause in the 
Constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to give to Congress a 
power to disarm the people.”83  Rawle’s understanding parallels that of the First 
Congress.  Yes, the militia system is important, and the first clause of the 
Amendment recognizes this.  But the Amendment’s second clause absolutely bars 
disarmament of the people. 
c.  Justice Joseph Story 
Justice Joseph Story is the third major commentator of the period.84  His 1833 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States85 refers to a right to arms that 
supports both popular resistance and a militia system, and to his fears that without a 
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 Historian Saul Cornell disputed Tucker’s commitment to an individual rights view, 
contending that his earlier lecture notes had emphasized the militia aspects of the Second 
Amendment.  Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original 
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123 (2006).  I 
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 ELIZABETH KELLEY BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 1790-1860 60 
(1965). 
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 DAVID PAUL BROWN, EULOGIUM UPON WILLIAM RAWLE 38 (Philadelphia, E. L. Carey & 
A. Hart 1837). 
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 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
125 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829) (1825). 
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  Id.  
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 Thomas Cooley is frequently listed as a fourth, but since he wrote well after the 
Framing period, he will be considered infra. 
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 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A 
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, 
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION (reprint 1991) (1833).  
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militia system the people will fail to own arms, which would undermine the purposes 
of the Second Amendment.  
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, 
as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong 
moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will 
generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, enable the 
people to resist and triumph over them.  And yet, though this truth would 
seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would seem 
so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people 
there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and a 
strong disposition, from a sense of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations.  
How it is practicable to keep the people duly armed without some 
organization, it is difficult to see.  There is certainly no small danger, that 
indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus 
gradually undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our 
national bill of rights.86 
While Story is the only one of the three major commentators to treat the Second 
Amendment as primarily militia-centric, he stresses both arms and the militia; 
indeed, his fear is that with the loss of the mandatory militia system it will be 
difficult to keep the people properly armed.  He gives no suggestion that a loss of the 
mandatory militia system renders nugatory any right to arms.  Indeed, his militia-
centric approach is inconsistent with a militia-uses-only concept of the right.  In that 
understanding, membership in a well-regulated militia is a legal precondition to a 
right to arms.  Story fears that a well-regulated militia may be a practical 
precondition to being armed, the lack of which will undermine the purpose of the 
Second Amendment. 
d.  Other Commentators of the Period 
There were also less influential Constitutional commentators during this period; 
these have been extensively surveyed by David Kopel.87  He documents twenty-five 
such 19th century commentators.88   As to the relationship between the Second 
Amendment’s two clauses, their most frequent theme is that the right to arms 
guarantees that the people can be skilled in arms, and thus enable formation of a 
militia.89  This the opposite of any collective right conceptualization, which sees 
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 Id. at 746-47. 
 
87
 David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1359. 
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 Id. at 1397-1408, 1468-1503. 
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 For example, Joel Tiffany explained, “The second amendment of the constitution 
provides that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, because a 
well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free state[,]” while John Norton 
Pomeroy wrote, “a militia would be useless unless citizens were allowed to exercise 
themselves in the use of warlike weapons.  To preserve this privilege, and to secure to the 
people the ability to oppose themselves in military force against usurpations of the 
government, as well as against enemies from without, that government is forbidden by any 
law or proceeding to invade or destroy the right to keep and bear arms.”  Id. at 1469, 1477. 
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militia service as a precondition of possession of a right to arms.  The later 
commentators also made reference to limits which could be placed on rights to arms, 
such as restrictions on concealed carry, or use in brawls,90 which again is 
inconsistent with a view that the right to arms was limited to militia service. 
2.  Evidence for a Militia-Only Right in Early Commentaries 
a.  Benjamin Oliver 
These views were not completely unanimous; one commentator did dissent.  In 
1832, a Benjamin Oliver published a booklet entitled The Rights of an American 
Citizen.91  Oliver spent a page discussing the virtues of the militia system. He then 
suggested, without citation to authority, that 
The provision of the constitution, declaring the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms, &c., was probably intended to apply to the right of the 
people to bear arms for such purposes only, and not to prevent congress or 
the legislatures of the different states from enacting laws to prevent the 
citizens from always going armed.  A different construction however has 
been given to it.92 
Oliver’s language is tentative (“probably,” “always going armed,” “a different 
construction however has been given it”) and supported by no references.  We know 
little of the author; a search of the Library of Congress’s catalog indicates he 
published a book on business law, and one of forms for conveyances.  A search of 
nineteenth century case law turns up no citations; the booklet’s one judicial citation 
comes after its 1970 reprinting.93  His influence cannot be ranked alongside that of 
Tucker, judge and author of the foremost legal text of his day, or Rawle, who had 
served in a body that ratified the Bill of Rights. 
Conclusion. Numerous early 19th century commentators, including leaders of the 
Framing generation, viewed the right to arms as an individual right which either (a) 
arose out of a right to self-defense or (b) existed as a precondition of the militia 
system, rather than the militia system existing as a precondition of the right.  The 
one dissenting voice appears to have had no discernable impact upon Americans’ 
understanding. 
B.  The Right To Arms In Pre-Civil War American Case Law 
Beginning in the 1820s, State courts faced issues arising from the interaction of 
early weapons laws, chiefly bans on concealed carry.94  Most rulings upheld the bans 
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(1832).  
 
92
 Id. at 177. 
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 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009-10 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). 
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 Excellent discussions of case law of this period can be found in STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, 
THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 89-98 (1984) and 
in Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 
500-04 (1995). 
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as reasonable restrictions on the manner of bearing, since arms could still be carried 
openly. 
1.  Antebellum Case Law Supporting an Individual Right to Arms 
Most of the case law of this period arose in the context of newly-enacted bans on 
concealed carry of all or certain arms, with the courts treating the right to arms as an 
individual one. 
The first such case, Bliss v. Commonwealth,95  struck down the Kentucky ban on 
concealed carry on the grounds that no restrictions on bearing of arms could be 
permissible: “whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that right, though 
not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden . . . .”96  In contrast, concealed weapon 
restrictions were upheld as reasonable regulation by Alabama97 and Louisiana.98  The 
Alabama court added a caveat: “A statute which, under the pretence of regulating, 
amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to 
render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly 
unconstitutional.”99 
The concept was soon given effect in a Georgia decision, Nunn v. State,100 which 
struck down a Georgia law which prohibited possession of all except the larger 
handguns (“horseman’s pistols”).  Georgia had no state right to arms provision, but 
the court viewed the Second Amendment as documenting a right which existed 
whether enumerated or not.  It rejected any claim that the right was limited to militia 
service: “The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and 
not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every description, and not such merely as 
are used by the militia, shall not be infringed . . . .”101 
Finally, Tennessee weighed in with a somewhat different approach, which would 
find greater popularity later in the century.  Its statute prohibited concealed carry 
only of Bowie knives and other listed weapons, and the court held that certain non-
military weapons were not “arms” within its constitutional guarantee.  The weapons 
whose carrying was protected were those “usually employed in civilized warfare,” 
not those “usually employed in private broils” or “by the robber and the assassin.”102  
It reasoned that the purpose of the arms right was so that citizens might “protect the 
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public liberty, to keep in awe those who are in power, and to maintain the supremacy 
of the laws” and that these needs were best served by military-type weaponry.103 
2.  Antebellum Case Law Supporting a Military-Use-Only View 
This survey is brief.  In State v. Buzzard,104 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a 
statute forbidding the concealed carrying of pistols and certain knives, against the 
background of a State constitution that had a “for the common defense” limitation.  
The three judges divided three ways. 
Chief Justice Ringo’s opinion referred to the constitutional language and found 
that the militia was “the best security a free state could have,” and that “for this 
purpose only, it is conceived the right to keep and bear arms was retained . . . .”105  
This understanding is militia-related but not necessarily militia-restricted; the 
Tennessee court had used the same understanding to conclude there was an 
individual right to possess and use military-type arms, since experience with them 
would serve militia purposes.  Chief Justice Ringo went on, though, to suggest, first, 
that the provision was militia-restricted, allowing a “legal right to keep and bear 
arms for that purpose.”106  Alternately, he viewed the concealed weapons ban as 
reasonable restriction of a right, since it “inhibits only the wearing of certain arms 
concealed.  This is simply a regulation as to the manner of bearing such arms as are 
specified.”107 
Justice Dickinson, concurring, did clearly take a militia-restricted view: “arms 
and the right to use them for that purpose [militia] are solely guaranteed.”108 
Justice Lacey, in dissent, took a pragmatic view along the lines later espoused by 
Thomas Cooley.109  Since the legislature controlled the membership of the militia, 
and could exclude whoever it willed, limiting the right to militia use would make a 
constitutional right “valueless and not worth preserving.”110 
Conclusion.  State case law prior to the Civil War, with one less-than-clear 
exception, treated the right to arms as an individual right, with no restriction to 
militia service.  The only questions were: (1) what regulation of the right is permitted 
and (2) whether the “arms” protected were only those which are military or militia 
suitable.  The one exception was a case involving a right to arms “for the common 
defense,” where one opinion accepted a militia-restricted view, one rejected it, and a 
third seemed to favor it. 
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III.  THE AMERICAN RIGHT TO ARMS AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 
We can survey American understanding of the period in terms of the abolitionist 
movement and its opposition, the understandings displayed in the formulation of the 
14th Amendment, and the teachings of case law and commentators during this time. 
It is appropriate first to note a historical change spanning the period before and 
during this time.  As we have seen above, Justice Story’s 1833 Commentaries on the 
Constitution complained that the universal, mandatory, militia system was in 
decline.111  By that point, Ohio and Delaware had abandoned mandatory militia 
service.112  In the 1840s, mandatory militia service was abolished in Massachusetts, 
Maine, Ohio, Vermont, Connecticut, New York, and Missouri; New Hampshire 
followed in the early 1850s.113  Following the Civil War, even voluntary militia units 
faded out in the North; their membership had largely enlisted in the regular forces, 
and after four years of fighting, had little interest in additional service.114  
Additionally, there was the effect of the Civil War itself, where State resistance to 
federal actions or predicted future actions led to the loss of 600,000 lives.  Against 
this background, the already weak militia-centric approach rapidly declined.  
A.  The Right to Arms, Abolitionism, and the Reaction to It 
We need not weigh evidence here; the historical record is entirely one-sided.  
Abolitionist writers (who were themselves at considerable physical risk) universally 
viewed the Second Amendment as an individual right linked to self-defense.115  
Lysander Spooner, for example, wrote that the right to arms implied the right to use 
arms “in defence of life, liberty, chastity, &c.,”116 while Joel Tiffany wrote that “the 
right to keep and bear arms, also implies the right to use them if necessary in self 
defence; without this right to use the guaranty would hardly have been worth the 
paper it consumed.”117 
On the pro-slavery side, the infamous Dred Scott case118 accepted this premise.  
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Taney argued that the states which agreed to 
form the United States could not have meant to accept free blacks as citizens, since a 
slave State would have to accord entering free blacks “the full liberty of speech in 
public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to 
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hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever 
they went.”119 
This unexpected agreement between abolitionist thinkers and the Dred Scott 
majority is paralleled by a concurrence between Republican and Democratic 
presidential platforms.  The 1856 Republican platform came in the wake of fighting 
in “Bleeding Kansas,” where attempts were made to disarm the anti-slavery side.  
The Republican platform argued “the dearest Constitutional rights of the people of 
Kansas have been fraudulently and violently taken from them . . . . The right of the 
people to keep and bear arms has been infringed.”120 
Conversely, after the outbreak of the Civil War, Union forces searched some 
Maryland homes for arms.  With the shoe on the other foot, the 1864 Democratic 
platform protested the imposition of martial law, “the suppression of freedom of 
speech and of the press . . . and the interference with and denial of the right of the 
people to bear arms in their defense.”121 
Conclusion.  The 1850s saw the most bitter of divides between abolitionists and 
the defenders of slavery.  But abolitionists and Chief Justice Taney, and Republicans 
and Democrats, agreed that the right to keep and bear arms was an individual one. 
B.  The Right to Arms and the Fourteenth Amendment 
Here, too, the relevant evidence is one-sided.  The historical record was 
extensively explored in McDonald v. Chicago: the majority points out,122 and the 
dissents do not deny, that when Congress considered the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
right to arms was frequently cited as one of the rights meant to be protected, and that 
all these references viewed it as an individual right unrelated to militia service.123 
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The Reconstruction Congress underscored this view when, in 1867, it voted to 
order dissolution of the Southern militias,124 while refraining from disarming their 
members out of concern that that would violate the Second Amendment. 
The dissolution bill began as a proposal by Senator Wilson which would have 
commanded that the militias (which he denounced as bands of former rebels bent 
upon terrorizing the freedmen) “be forthwith disarmed and disbanded . . . .”125  On 
the floor, Senator Willey objected: “It strikes me also that there may be some 
constitutional objection against depriving men of the right to bear arms and the total 
disarming of men in time of peace.”126  
Senator Wilson responded that he was willing to “modify the amendment by 
striking out the word ‘disarmed.’  Then it will provide simply for disbanding these 
organizations.”127  Senator Willey found the amended bill, which dissolved militia 
units but preserved the individual right to arms for these former enemies, “much 
more acceptable to me than it was originally,”128 and in that form it was enacted.129 
C.  The Right to Arms in Postwar Courts and Commentators 
Postwar courts faced right to arms issues at both state and federal levels. Both 
bodies of the judiciary treat the right as an individual one, not limited to military 
service, and state courts focused on determining its boundaries. 
1.  Postwar State Case Law 
Most legal challenges of this period arose out of a wave of enactments barring 
carrying (but not ownership) of non-gun weapons such as bowie knives, sharply 
pointed daggers known as “Arkansas toothpicks,” and impact weapons such as brass 
knuckles and “slung shots.”130  Some enactments also extended to carrying of small 
handguns.  (In the vernacular of the time, handguns were divided into “holster” or 
“horse” pistols, very large firearms holstered on the saddle, “belt” pistols of standard 
military size suitable for carry in a belt, and “pocket” pistols, the smallest class of 
handguns). 
The best-reasoned case of the period came from Tennessee.  Andrews v. State131 
held overbroad a ban on carrying (openly or concealed) a “belt or pocket pistol or 
revolver.”132  The ruling came against an unusually extensive legal background.  
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Defending the statute, the Attorney General argued for a militia-use-only 
interpretation: “it is the bearing of arms, not for private broils and purposes of blood, 
but in defense of a common cause; as citizen soldiers bearing arms for the defense, 
in common with each other; not commonly; i.e., on ordinary occasions.”133 
The Andrews court rejected his view.  Indeed, it reasoned that the right to “keep” 
covered certain forms of carrying arms; its purpose was to ensure that a citizen was 
sufficiently proficient in their use to participate in the common defense, and that 
implied a right to transport ordinary firearms for practice.134 
Arkansas enacted carrying restrictions similar to those of Tennessee, and its 
rulings tracked those of that state.  Fife v. State135 involved a defendant charged with 
“carrying a pistol as a weapon.”136  The court avoided constitutional problems by 
construing the ban to cover only small handguns, “used in private quarrels and 
brawls,” and not ones of military size.137  Later, in Wilson v. State,138 the court held 
the ban was invalid as applied to a full-sized revolver: “to prohibit the citizen from 
wearing or carrying a war arm . . . is an unwarranted restriction upon his 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”139 
Other courts accepted the reasoning of the Tennessee and Arkansas rulings.  In 
English v. State,140 a Texas court upheld that state’s ban on carrying various knives 
and small handguns with the note that “[t]he terms dirks, daggers, slungshots, sword-
canes, brass-knuckles and bowie knives, belong to no military vocabulary.”141  Still 
others treated limits on carrying as raising the issue of reasonable regulation of a 
constitutional right.142  In several of these decisions the State cited the militia-use-
only ruling in State v. Buzzard, but no court took the decision seriously enough to 
mention it.143 
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In short, it is clear that state courts of the period took seriously a right to arms, 
and treated it as an individual right.  At most, they allowed that the right might be 
limited to arms of a military nature, or (more broadly) arms whose use gave skills 
that might enable a citizen to participate in the common defense. 
2.  Postwar Federal Case Law 
The Supreme Court likewise gave no indication that it saw the right to arms as 
restricted to militia service.  In United State v. Cruikshank,144 the issue was whether 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause made the federal rights 
to assemble and to keep and bear arms applicable to the States.  Cruikshank was a 
Louisiana sheriff who was one of the leaders in the infamous Colfax Courthouse 
Massacre, where a mob broke up an assembly of blacks, disarmed them, and then 
killed over a hundred of them.145  
The relevant clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade States to abridge “the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”  The Cruikshank Court 
eviscerated this by holding that: (1) this could only describe rights created (as 
opposed to guaranteed) by the U.S. Constitution, and (2) these did not include rights 
that could be seen as natural, inherent in any free government, and thus pre-existing 
the creation of U.S. citizenship.146  Thus the Court ruled the right to assemble and the 
right to arms outside the protections of the privileges or immunities clause, because 
they had pre-existed their written guarantee: 
The particular amendment now under consideration assumes the existence 
of the right of the people to assemble for lawful purposes, and protects it 
against encroachment by Congress.  The right was not created by the 
amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed, except as against 
congressional interference. 
 
. . . . 
 
The second and tenth counts are equally defective.  The right there 
specified is that of “bearing arms for a lawful purpose.”  This is not a 
right granted by the Constitution.  Neither is it in any manner dependent 
upon that instrument for its existence.147 
It is easy to see how an individual right to arms for self-defense could be 
characterized as a natural right that pre-existed the Constitution.  It is quite hard to 
see how a right to engage in organized militia activities could meet that description.   
3.  Postwar Constitutional Commentators 
As with the courts, so with the commentators of the late 19th century.  The 
leading constitutional commentator of the period was Thomas Cooley, Michigan 
Supreme Court justice and professor of law, considered by one scholar to have been 
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“the greatest authority on constitutional law in the world.”148  Of the Second 
Amendment, Cooley wrote: 
The Right is General. — It may be supposed from the phraseology of this 
provision that the right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the 
militia; but this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent.  
The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, consists of those persons 
who, under the law, are liable to the performance of military duty, and are 
officered and enrolled for service when called upon.  But the law may 
make provision for the enrolment of all who are fit to perform military 
duty, or of a small number only, or it may wholly omit to make any 
provision at all; and if the right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose 
of this guaranty might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to 
act of the government it was meant to hold in check.  The meaning of the 
provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the militia must be 
taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and they need no 
permission or regulation of law for the purpose.  But this enables the 
government to have a well-regulated militia; for to bear arms implies 
something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to handle 
and use them in a way that makes those who keep them ready for their 
efficient use; in other words, it implies the right to meet for voluntary 
discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public order.149 
The other great commentator of the period was Joel Bishop, famed for his analysis of 
the criminal law.  His Commentaries on the Criminal Law treated the right to arms 
as an individual right, albeit one excluding non-military arms and criminal uses. 
The constitution of the United States provides, that, “a well-regulated 
militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”  This provision is 
found among the amendments; and, though most of the amendments are 
restrictions on the General Government alone, not on the States, this one 
seems to be of a nature to bind both the State and National legislatures.  
If, however, we look to the question of its interpretation in the light of 
judicial reason, without the aid of specific authority, we shall be led to the 
conclusion, that the provision protects only the right to “keep” such 
“arms” as are used for purposes of war, in distinction from those which 
are employed in quarrels and brawls and fights between maddened 
individuals; since such, only, are properly known by the name of arms; 
and such, only, are adapted to promote “the security of a free State.”  In 
like manner, the right to “bear” arms refers merely to the military way of 
using them, not to their use in bravado and affray.  Still, the Georgia 
tribunal seems to have held, that a statute prohibiting the open wearing of 
arms upon the person violates this provision of the constitution, though a 
statute against the wearing of the arms concealed does not.  And, in 
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accord with the latter branch of this Georgia doctrine, the Louisiana court 
has laid it down, that the statute against carrying concealed weapons does 
not infringe the constitutional right of the people to keep and bear arms; 
for this statute is a measure of police, prohibiting only a particular mode 
of bearing arms, found dangerous to the community.150 
 Conclusion.  By the end of the Nineteenth Century, acceptance of a purely 
individual right to arms was literally universal.  Congress, federal and state courts, 
and commentators all saw the right to arms as having no restriction to militia duties.  
The only issues were to what extent this private right could be regulated, and 
whether its “arms” included weapons more suited to brawling and street crime than 
to resistance to political oppression. 
IV.  THE MILITIA-RESTRICTED RIGHT TO ARMS’ ORIGINS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 
We are left with a paradox.  If the militia-uses-only view was unknown to the 
Framers, and nearly so to courts, Congress, and commentators for a century after the 
Framing, whence did it arise? 
The evidence indicates that the collective right view (1) had a tentative origin in 
the early 20th century; (2) it began to gain ground in the mid-century based upon 
policy considerations (primarily the need to sustain the National Firearms Act’s 
restrictions upon machine guns and related arms) rather than law or history; (3) it 
gained widespread acceptance among lower federal courts in the 1960s, and 
thereafter as a means of upholding firearm laws in general. 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of collective rights in District of Columbia v. 
Heller was thus no legal novelty; it was simply a refusal to accept a recent invention 
of lower courts.  We will examine the 20th century trend in three parts.  The first will 
be the right to arms as it was seen prior to United States v. Miller;151 the second will 
be its treatment in Miller; the third will discuss the lower court reactions to Miller, 
and the countering reaction from the legal academy. 
A.  The Right to Arms 1900 – 1939 
1.  1905: City of Salina v. Blaksley 
Early in the century came the first clear use, and the first use since State v. 
Buzzard, of a militia-use-only reading of a state constitution.  The case arose in 
Kansas, whose right to arms clause did have an exceptionally military context.  The 
constitutional provision referred only to bearing, and not keeping, of arms, had a link 
to the people’s “defense and security,” and was accompanied by two references to 
clearly military affairs: “The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and 
security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not 
be tolerated, and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.”152 
In 1905, James Blaksley was charged with possessing (and apparently firing) a 
firearm while intoxicated, in violation of a city ordinance.  Blaksley appealed his 
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misdemeanor conviction all the way to the Kansas Supreme Court, which showed 
little sympathy for litigious, armed drunks, and affirmed his conviction. 
An interesting feature of Blaksley was that neither party contended that the right 
to arms was limited to militia service, likely because there was almost no precedent 
supporting such an approach (State v. Buzzard is not cited in the Kansas ruling and 
apparently was undiscovered by the court).  The State argued that the right to arms 
was limited to military-type arms, whereas Blaksley had fired off a small .32 caliber 
pocket pistol; it also contended that a restriction on carrying while intoxicated was a 
reasonable regulation of the right.153  Blaksley, on the other hand, contended that the 
right to arms was absolute, protecting both pocket pistols and carrying while 
intoxicated.154 
The Kansas court came up with its own rationale, noting that the state provision, 
taken in context, “deals exclusively with the military.  Individual rights are not 
considered in this section.”155  It treated the Second Amendment (which had no such 
context) in the same way: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms for their 
security is preserved, and the manner of bearing them for such purpose is clearly 
indicated to be as a member of a well-regulated militia, or some other military 
organization provided for by law.”156 
The court cited two authorities, neither of which supported its position.  The first 
was Joel Bishop’s Commentaries on The Law of Statutory Crimes,157 from which it 
took a passage stating, “the keeping and bearing of arms has reference only to war 
and possibly also to insurrections wherein the forms of war are, as far as practicable 
observed.”158  One is left wondering what Bishop was thinking when he wrote of a 
constitutional right to bear arms in insurrections!  The court’s citation actually omits 
part of the relevant sentence: “In reason the keeping and bearing of arms has 
reference only to war and possibly also to insurrections wherein the forms of war 
are, as far as practicable observed”; yet certainly not to broils, bravado, and tumult, 
disturbing the public repose, or to private assassination and secret revenge.159  
Bishop is explaining (rather clumsily) that the right to arms relates to enabling 
political resistance and does not cover criminal use. 
Blaksley’s second reference was to Commonwealth v. Murphy,160 which had 
upheld a statute forbidding non-militia organizations to drill and parade with 
firearms.  The state court held that “it is within the police power of the legislature to 
regulate the bearing of arms, so as to forbid such unauthorized drills and parades.”161  
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Murphy was a “reasonable regulation” ruling, not one holding that the bearing of 
arms was only protected during militia duty. 
2.  1915: Lucilius Emery’s Harvard Law Review Article 
A decade after the decision, Blaksley formed the basis of an article in the Harvard 
Law Review, by Lucilius Emery.162  The article’s tone was tentative, its author 
beginning with note that his arguments referred only to bearing arms, not to keeping 
them: “I think there are deducible several propositions as to the power of the 
legislature to restrict and even forbid carrying weapons by individuals, however 
powerless it may be as to the simple possessing or keeping weapons.”163 
First, he noted that legislatures might control the carrying of weapons that are not 
suited for use in civilized warfare, such as daggers and brass knuckles.  This was of 
course in accord with existing precedent.  Second, he suggested that only men 
suitable for military service should be protected.  “Women, young boys, the blind, 
tramps, persons non compos mentis, or dissolute in habits, may be prohibited from 
carrying weapons.”164  This would fit under the concept of reasonable (or in many 
cases, unreasonable) regulation.  He ended on an ambiguous note: 
Lastly, I submit that the right guaranteed is not so much to the individual 
for his private quarrels or feuds as to the people collectively for the 
common defense against the common enemy, foreign or domestic.  The 
guaranty is to insure the safety of the people, their “laws and liberties,” 
against assaults from any source or quarter, but not to give individuals 
singly or in groups uncontrollable means of aggression upon the rights of 
others.  Granting that the individual may carry weapons when necessary 
for his personal defense or that of his family or property, it is submitted 
that he may be forbidden to carry dangerous weapons except in cases 
where he has reason to believe and does believe that it is necessary for 
such defense.165 
3.  Reception of the “Militia-Uses-Only” Concept in Case Law Prior to 1939 
Neither Blaksley nor the article spawned a trend in case law.  Early Twentieth 
Century courts continued to treat the right to arms as an individual right.  Thus In Re 
Brickey166 invalidated an Idaho law banning carrying of handguns within cities and 
towns, holding that it violated both the State constitution and the Second 
Amendment.  In Glasscock v. City of Chattanooga,167 the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee held that a city ordinance forbidding the carrying of handguns offended 
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the State guarantee of a right to arms.  People v. Zerillo168 struck down a Michigan 
statute requiring noncitizens to obtain a permit before possessing a revolver.  People 
v. Nakamura169 struck down a similar Colorado law, the court refusing to accept the 
State’s claim that the right to arms was “one of collective enjoyment for common 
defense.”170  State v. Kerner171 invalidated a North Carolina statute that required a 
permit for open carry of a handgun. The ruling had an interesting populist twist: 
To exclude all pistols, however, is not a regulation, but a prohibition, of 
arms which come under the designation of “arms” which the people are 
entitled to bear.  This is not an idle or an obsolete guaranty, for there are 
still localities, not necessary to mention, where great corporations, under 
the guise of detective agents or private police, terrorize their employees 
by armed force.  If the people are forbidden to carry the only arms within 
their means, among them pistols, they will be completely at the mercy of 
these great plutocratic organizations.172 
Even within Kansas itself, Blaksley had an uncertain acceptance.  A 1975 
ruling173 treated it as good law, but a 1979 decision,174 holding a firearm law 
unconstitutional due to overbreadth, cast doubt upon this.  As this article was being 
written, Kansas voters amended its Bill of Rights to recognize a clearly individual 
right, mooting the Blaksley holding.175 
Conclusion.  It is apparent that while the period 1900-1939 saw the birth of the 
collective rights theory, the infant failed to thrive.  It was the invention of a state 
court, so novel that neither party had briefed the theory, and arose out of the unique 
wording of the State guarantee.  Other state courts continued to treat the right to 
arms as an individual one.  Blaksley gave rise to no case law, and Emery’s 
ambiguous article failed even to spawn more articles. 
B.  1939: United States v. Miller 
1.  Miller in the District Court 
In 1934, Congress passed the first significant federal firearms measure.  The 
National Firearms Act of that year imposed a $200 excise tax (and through its 
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reporting, registration) upon a narrow class of firearms, chiefly machine guns and 
short barreled (“sawed off”176) shotguns and rifles.177  
Five years later, in United States v. Miller,178 the U.S. Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this measure.  It managed a ruling 
so ambiguous that seventy years later its core meaning was still in dispute: in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, both majority and the dissent could make a decent 
claim to Miller’s support.179  Miller’s only halfway clear holding was that perhaps 
not every tax on everything that goes “bang!” will, by that fact alone, come within 
the protection of the Second Amendment.  Miller’s real significance is not what it 
said, but what lower courts could later read it to say.  It is thus important to grasp 
how completely muddled — and probably collusive — the case was from its very 
outset. 
The defendants, Jackson “Jack” Miller and Frank Layton, were a pair of bank 
robbers; Miller in particular had followed the hazardous course of alternating his 
criminal career with snitching out his cohorts in exchange for leniency.180  Their 
transportation of an untaxed short-barreled shotgun earned them an indictment in the 
Western District of Arkansas, Judge Heartsill Ragon presiding. 
Citing the Second Amendment and no other authority, Judge Ragon dismissed 
the indictment.181  Perhaps because it had failed to appeal in time, the government re-
indicted Miller and Layton, and Ragon again dismissed.182 
Judge Ragon’s actions gave the government a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court.183  Since they were taken without evidentiary findings or, indeed any 
evidence, the dismissal could only be sustained if the Second Amendment was so 
absolute that even machineguns and sawed-off shotguns were protected against 
registration and taxation. 
Seventy years later, Brian L. Frye explored the history of the case, and reached 
the remarkable conclusion that the appeal was almost certainly collusive.184  Judge 
Ragon had, before being appointed to the bench, served for many years in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, where he introduced, endorsed, and supported federal 
firearms laws.185  He argued on the floor that “I am unequivocally opposed to pistols 
in any connection whatever” and dismissed Second Amendment concerns with the 
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observation that his State had prohibited pistol sales and the measure had been 
upheld.186  (In this, Rep. Ragon was mistaken.)187  It is hard to explain why a judge 
who believed that an absolute ban on ordinary pistol sales passed constitutional 
muster, would believe that registering and taxing sawed-off shotguns was facially 
unconstitutional. 
Research into Judge Ragon’s papers at the University of Arkansas188 casts little 
light on Miller itself: while Judge Ragon was a prolific writer, no extant document 
mentions the ruling. Several things did, however, stand out. 
First, the District Court had little in the way of research tools, and nothing that 
would have led Judge Ragon to change his mind on the right to arms.  He was quite 
proud that the District Court had acquired a set of United States Code Annotated for 
each of its four courthouses.189  The Federal Supplement was a scarcer commodity; 
apparently the courthouses had to share a single set.190  That reporter’s one relevant 
reference was to another District Court which had sustained the National Firearms 
Act as constitutional.191 
Second, Judge Ragon remained a Washington insider even while on the bench.  
His judicial correspondence files were mundane, consisting of granting excuses from 
jury duty or brushing aside requests that he recommend parole.  His political files 
were anything but mundane.  He wrote Rep. William Bankhead, coaching him on his 
run against Sam Rayburn for Speaker of the House, and reporting a head count of the 
Arkansas delegation on the matter.192  He reported to Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
on conditions in Mexico,193 and wrote President Roosevelt on behalf of Arkansas’ 
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governor.194  During “an hour or two of recess from the court,” he wrote a letter 
endorsing another Arkansas Representative’s desire to succeed him on House Ways 
and Means.195  Yet another letter urges Sen. Hattie Caraway to obtain a government 
post for “Beanie” Bell, “the most effective political worker in Sebastian County . . . . 
You will need him daily in this section when your campaign gets in action.”196  
Judge Ragon’s plan was detailed: 
Now, what I want you to do is to go down and see Attorney General 
Cummings personally and tell him that you want this man; that it means a 
lot to you personally.  Now, don’t telephone or don’t let Garrett 
telephone, but go down there personally and see the Attorney General and 
you will have no trouble.  Now, Mrs. Caraway, I can’t over emphasize the 
importance of this to you. I am writing the Attorney General today . . . .197 
Judge Ragon also had close ties with Treasury’s Alcohol Tax Unit, which was 
charged with enforcing the National Firearms Act and would have approved the 
charges against Miller.  The Unit’s District Supervisor was John J. Burkett.198  While 
Miller was under advisement in the Supreme Court, Ragon wrote a member of the 
House, describing Burkett as “a lifelong, close, personal friend of mine,” and asking 
for his promotion in light of “the smooth running of the Alcohol Tax United under 
his supervision.”199 
Judge Ragon’s role an Administration “insider” must be placed in political 
context.  The FDR administration was then seeking greatly to expand the federal law 
enforcement role, and establishing broad federal control over firearms was a key 
component of this campaign.  Its legislative successes were the 1934 National 
Firearms Act, discussed above, and the 1938 Federal Firearms Act,200 which for the 
first time applied federal controls to commerce in ordinary firearms.  The 
Administration – and in particular Attorney General Homer Cummings and his 
assistant Joseph B. Keenan – spent much of the period from 1934 through 1938 
seeking still more. 
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In a 1934 speech, Cummings had listed among his twelve highest priorities: “A 
law to regulate the importation, manufacture or sale, or other disposition of machine 
guns and concealable firearms.”201  The National Firearms Act was actually 
something of a disappointment to him.  As originally proposed, it had required 
registration, not just of machineguns and short-barreled long arms, but also of 
handguns.  The extension to handguns was, however, removed in committee 
consideration; Keenan responded with a speech denouncing the deletion, to no 
avail.202 
Cummings spent much of the period from 1935 through 1938 seeking to restore 
the deletion, and to enact further national firearm measures.  Among Cummings’ 
papers is a 1935 memorandum from Joseph Keenan, proposing to seek new 
legislation to include pistols within the National Firearms Act, and in the longer term 
(preceded by a public relations campaign) to push for  tight firearm permit 
requirements along the lines of those of Great Britain.203  The following year 
Cummings published magazine articles endorsing national handgun registration,204 
and in 1937 and 1938 he campaigned to extend those requirements to rifles and 
shotguns as well.205 
In short, the FDR Administration viewed extensive federal firearm controls, right 
up to national registration and permit systems for all firearms, as a high legislative 
priority.  Judge Ragon was a political insider who had argued that even firearm bans 
were constitutional.  He was an unlikely man to “go activist,” with a ruling that 
would bar as unconstitutional the entire arena of national firearm controls.  If the 
federal government could not register even machine guns and sawed-off shotguns, it 
is hard to see what it could do in the area of firearm controls. 
On the other hand, if Judge Ragon wanted to arrange a test case that would 
remove the Second Amendment as a barrier to the Administration’s plans, Miller’s 
case was near-perfect: a Second Amendment challenge to registration of sawed-off 
shotguns, brought by a bank robber, after a cursory ruling that handed the 
government a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 
2.  Miller in the Supreme Court 
If that was Judge Ragon’s purpose, his move seemed destined for success.  On 
March 15, the Clerk of the Supreme Court wrote Miller’s attorney, Paul Gutensohn, 
informing him the Court had taken the case and it would be argued on March 31!206  
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A week later Gutensohn wrote back, stating that he had not even received the 
government’s brief.207  On March 25, the Clerk replied that 
You are correct in your understanding that the appellant is required to file 
a brief, and ordinarily appellant’s brief is required to be filed three weeks 
before the date of argument.  Toward the end of the Term cases are 
reached so promptly after preliminary consideration that it is very often 
impossible to comply with the rules as to the filing of briefs and the 
argument of the cases is not delayed for that reason.208 
The Clerk added the government had provided Gutensohn with a typewritten brief, 
and that Gutensohn could file his brief in the next week, or argument could be put 
over to April 17.209 
 
Gutensohn was having none of it. On March 28, he telegraphed the Clerk: 
US VS MILLER ET AL NUMBER 696 – SUGGEST CASE BE 
SUBMITTED ON APPELLANTS BRIEF.  UNABLE TO OBTAIN 
ANY MONEY FROM CLIENTS TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT & 
ARGUE CASE 
 
  PAUL E. GUTENSOHN.210 
Apparently concerned that he had not been entirely clear as to the briefing, he 
followed the next day with “DO NOT INTEND TO FILE BRIEF = PAUL E. 
GUTENSOHN.”211 
The stage seemed set for a decision that would narrow, if not negate, the Second 
Amendment.  Judge Ragon’s order had given the government a direct appeal of a 
decision that could only be defended under an absolutist view of the Amendment’s 
meaning.  Gutensohn’s decision meant there would no opposing brief – indeed, he 
was recommending that the case be decided based on the government’s arguments. 
Then fate took a hand. 
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Probably because of the time pressures involved, especially in a case of first 
impression, the government filed a rambling brief with little internal organization.212  
Its arguments can be outlined as: 
 
1. The common law allowed regulation of the carrying of exceptionally 
“dangerous or unusual” weapons; this argument then merged into the 
1689 Declaration of Rights’ recognition of a right to arms “suitable to 
their conditions and as allowed by law.” 
2. This was followed by a reference to a “collective rights” concept; the 
right related to “arming of the people as a body” to deter tyranny, not to 
“keeping of arms for purposes of private defense.”213 
3. An argument that the purpose of the right to arms was to avoid creation 
of a standing army (rather a moot point by 1939). 
4. An argument that the “arms” whose possession is protected refers only 
to weapons of military or militia use.  The government cited Aymette, 
Fife and other cases, and argued that a sawed-off shotgun was a weapon 
of gangsters rather than of militiamen. 
 
If the case were to be decided upon the government’s position, it was going to 
take some effort to ascertain what that position was. And here the human factor came 
into play. 
The Chief Justice assigned the Miller opinion to Justice James McReynolds.  
This probably reflects the low priority given the case, which had been presented with 
one side poorly briefed, and the other not briefed at all. 
McReynolds was, to put it charitably, not a Justice to be entrusted with a 
significant constitutional ruling.  He was a racist, anti-Semite, misogynist, and 
undifferentiated bigot: Chief Justice Taft described him as “fuller of prejudice than 
any man I have ever known,” and “selfish to the last degree.”214  Historians disagree 
on whether Woodrow Wilson nominated him to the bench to get him out of his 
position as Attorney General, where he had alienated much of the Cabinet.215   On 
the Court, he repeated his performance, shunning and insulting the other Justices.216 
More to the point, Reynolds was incredibly lazy and slipshod.  The Chief Justice 
considered him a man with “no sense of duty,” in good part because of his tendency 
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to go duck-hunting, with no notice, while leaving opinions unwritten.217  When he 
did write, he was cursory.  “McReynold’s opinions ran short because, as in Hopkins 
v. Hebard, he cited little supporting authority and did not discuss the authority he did 
cite . . . . In some opinions he declined to cite case authority at all.”218  An 
examination of Justice McReynolds’ contributions to October Term 1938 confirms 
this evaluation.  The signed opinions of that Term span 1,778 pages.219  To that, 
McReynolds’ opinions contributed 97 pages, mostly comprising remarkably brief 
rulings.220 
It is also apparent that the Chief Justice assigned him only uncontroversial cases, 
or safe ones where errors would have less consequence.  While the Court was 
sharply divided, McReynolds was entrusted only with unanimous opinions.  The 
subject matter was often rather banal – an admiralty suit over spoiled fish meal,221 
whether the dormant Commerce Clause applied to interstate shipment of a dead 
horse,222 whether the conditional seller of a forfeited automobile met the statutory 
standard for an innocent interest-owner.223  The remainder largely involved issues 
with obvious answers: a gift from an 80 year old male with health problems was a 
transfer in contemplation of death,224 a creditor cannot execute upon a disabled 
veteran’s pension,225 two states cannot impose full inheritance taxes on the same 
trust,226 a search incident to arrest can occur on private property.227 
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McReynolds was, in short, an intellectually lazy man on a rather brilliant court.  
The Chief Justice, who as noted above had little respect for his reliability, probably 
gave him Miller because it seemed safe: a potential 9-0, where only one side had 
briefed, and the issue was whether a bank robber could challenge a tax on sawed-off 
shotguns. 
The result was an opinion outstanding for its lack of clarity — which explains 
why in Heller, it could be cited as support for the majority, which held for a right to 
arms for individual purposes, in Justice Stevens’ dissent, which repudiated such a 
right, and in Justice Souter’s dissent, which accepted such a right arguendo, but 
maintained a handgun ban was reasonable regulation.228 
The one halfway clear part of McReynold’s opinion came at the beginning: 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 
“shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length” at this 
time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of 
a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment 
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.  Certainly it is 
not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary 
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common 
defense.229 
By this standard, Miller was as much a ruling on the law of evidence as it was on 
the Constitution.  Even here it is murky.  The first sentence argues that possession of 
an arm is protected if that has a “reasonable relationship” (a rather loose standard) to 
the efficiency of the militia.  The second sentence refers to protection of “ordinary 
military equipment” and cites Aymette, which suggested that military arms were 
protected by the right to arms, and Bowie knives were not.  This would suggest (but 
not clearly rule) that the “reasonable relationship” is met if civilian practice with an 
arm would develop militarily-useful skills.  The first sentence might be read to 
support a right related (in some unspecified way) to militia service; the second 
sentence supports a more individualistic right to possession and practice with 
military-type arms.  No wonder that both the Heller majority and its dissents could 
find comfort in Miller! 
The opinion went downhill from there. McReynolds follows with a reference to 
Congressional power over the militia and the note that “[w]ith obvious purpose to 
assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the 
declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made.  It must be 
interpreted and applied with that end in view.”230  The opinion does not explain the 
latter point: Is the militia concept a limit to the right, or merely counsel upon its 
meaning? 
Next, McReynolds turned to the question of what is the militia, citing Framing 
period sources which 
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show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically 
capable of acting in concert for the common defense.  “A body of citizens 
enrolled for military discipline.”  And further, that ordinarily when called 
for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by 
themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.231 
Here we have three different concepts, listed without analysis.  Is the militia all 
physically suitable males, or only those enrolled in an organization?  What is the 
significance of the fact that they were expected to produce arms “of the kind in 
common use?”  Is this merely a historical note — militiamen were expected to bring 
what they had, not cannons and mortars or medieval catapults — or a limitation of 
the scope of the right?  If a limitation, does “in common use” relate to then, or now?  
In common use by civilians, or by the military?232  Miller gave no clue. 
Finally, rather than analyzing available case law and commentators, McReynolds 
simply noted “[i]n the margin, some of the more important opinions and comments 
by writers are cited.”233  Among the sources cited were  Blaksley, which held that the 
right to arms was limited to militia service; both Aymette and Fife, which held that it 
was not; Joseph Story, who discussed the Amendment in terms of the militia; and 
Thomas Cooley, who vigorously denied that its protections were limited to militia 
service.  None were given a word of analysis or reconciliation. 
Miller, in short, probably began as a collusive case, set up to be an easy win for 
the government.  This plan backfired, due to a rambling, one-sided briefing, and 
assignment of the “easy cases” to the lazy Justice McReynolds.  As a result, in the 
lower courts Miller became not so much guidance as an obstacle to be circumvented 
and later mere background material to be invoked in passing. 
C.  1939 – 2008: Miller in the Lower Courts 
1.  Early Decisions: Cases and Tot 
The first two Circuits to deal with Miller did so in the context of the Federal 
Firearm Act’s prohibition on interstate receipt of firearms by those convicted of 
violent felonies.  While it would seem this restriction would easily pass muster as a 
reasonable restriction of any right to arms, the courts spent considerable time 
grappling with Miller’s murky reasoning. 
In Cases v. United States,234 the First Circuit concluded that, under Miller, the 
government “cannot prohibit the possession or use of any weapon which has any 
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated 
militia.”235  “However,” it added, “we do not feel that the Supreme Court in this case 
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was attempting to formulate a general rule applicable to all cases.”236  The First 
Circuit did not distinguish Miller so much as refuse to follow it: 
At any rate the rule of the Miller case, if intended to be comprehensive 
and complete would seem to be already outdated, in spite of the fact that it 
was formulated only three and a half years ago, because of the well 
known fact that in the so called ‘Commando Units’ some sort of military 
use seems to have been found for almost any modern lethal weapon.237 
It then announced, with no citation to authority, a militia-use-only rule, or a least a 
strict version of a militia-related requirement.  It noted that the defendant had taken 
the pistol to a night club and shot another patron and 
[w]hile the weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least 
familiarity with it might be regarded as of value in training a person to use 
a comparable weapon of military type and caliber, still there is no 
evidence that the appellant was or ever had been a member of any military 
organization or that his use of the weapon under the circumstances 
disclosed was in preparation for a military career.  In fact, the only 
inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the 
indictment was in possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and 
ammunition purely and simply on a frolic of his own and without any 
thought or intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated 
militia which the Second Amendment was designed to foster as necessary 
to the security of a free state.238 
As Professor Denning has noted, 
Far from reading it as rendering no protection to an individual's right to 
keep and bear arms, the Cases court assumed, by carrying Justice 
McReynold’s reasoning to its logical conclusion, that the Miller opinion, 
if intended as a general rule, afforded entirely too much protection to a 
wide range of potentially destructive devices that individuals might seek 
to possess.  The Second Circuit thus rejected the Miller decision out of 
hand and proceeded, inexplicably, to engraft a state of mind requirement 
onto the Second Amendment where one had not previously existed . . . . 
The Cases decision serves as a good example of a case decided according 
to what Karl Llewellyn would call the judges’ “sense of the situation.”  
The court assumed that, as a matter of public policy, any meaningful 
limitation upon the government’s ability to restrict private ownership of 
arms is bad; and the court decided the case accordingly, assuming that the 
framers of the Second Amendment did not intend it to present an 
impediment to the government in this regard.239 
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In United States v. Tot,240 the Third Circuit at least tried to follow Miller, 
suggesting that the defendant, a convicted violent felon, had failed to show that his 
possession of a pistol was linked to the preservation of a well-regulated militia, but 
concluded 
the same result is definitely indicated on a broader ground and on this we 
should prefer to rest the matter.  Weapon bearing was never treated as 
anything like an absolute right by the common law . . . . One could hardly 
argue seriously that a limitation upon the privilege of possessing weapons 
was unconstitutional when applied to a mental patient of the maniac type.  
The same would be true if the possessor were a child of immature years.  
In the situation at bar Congress has prohibited the receipt of weapons 
from interstate transactions by persons who have previously, by due 
process of law, been shown to be aggressors against society.  Such a 
classification is entirely reasonable and does not infringe upon the 
preservation of the well regulated militia protected by the Second 
Amendment.241 
Cases cited no authority for its interpretation of the Second Amendment, and 
expressly acknowledged it was trying to circumvent, rather than follow, United 
States v. Miller.242  Tot ultimately centered upon reasonable regulation of the right 
involved, a position quite defensible in the context of a convicted violent felon. 
At that, the two rulings lay largely quiescent, as did the firearm issue itself, for 
the next thirty years. 
2.  1970-2000: The Spread of “Collective Rights” in the Lower Federal Courts 
Cases and Tot did set the stage for the next development, as the gun control 
policy issue came to the forefront in the late 1960s and the following decade.  The 
lower federal courts widely employed variants of a collective rights view to rebuff 
challenges to firearms restrictions.  “Unfortunately, many of these contemporary 
courts seized on Cases’ bizarre state of mind requirement and Tot’s unsupported 
‘collective theory’ interpretation as a convenient way to dispose of bothersome 
Second Amendment claims.  Further, many courts began to cite Miller as actually 
standing for the holdings in Cases and Tot.”243 
One approach involved paraphrasing the Miller references to arms suitable for 
militia use into “militia arms,” and then treating “militia arms” as being arms 
actually in use for militia duties.  By the 1980s, courts taking this approach were apt 
simply to invoke Miller as establishing “that the right to keep and bear arms extends 
only to those arms which are necessary to maintain a well regulated militia” and thus 
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that “[u]nder the controlling authority of Miller we conclude that the right to keep 
and bear handguns is not guaranteed by the second amendment.”244 
A second approach was the purest form of “collective right.”  In the words of the 
Sixth Circuit, “[s]ince the Second Amendment right ‘to keep and bear Arms’ applies 
only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individual’s right to 
bear arms, there can be no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an 
individual to possess a firearm.”245 
A third approach involved taking the second position to its logical extreme, and 
holding that individuals lacked even standing to raise a Second Amendment 
challenge, since the right involved was that of a State. 246 
The first of these variants at least involved an attempt to follow Miller’s 
ambiguous reasoning; the second, and still more so the third, reached conclusions 
difficult to reconcile with that decision.  The lower courts following the three 
variants made no attempt to examine the historical record; their view of history 
began in 1939, or perhaps 1942.  To be fair, at the beginning of this period, there had 
been little documentation of the relevant history.  That was about to change. 
3.  1975-2010: The Downfall of Collective Right Theories 
The collective right approach had been hastily constructed; it was about to be 
subjected to a detailed criticism, which came in three waves. 
The first wave consisted of researchers who, over several decades, uncovered and 
documented the seemingly-lost history of the right to arms.247  These discoveries, or 
rediscoveries, need not be detailed here, since they represent the content of the first 
portion of this article. 
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The second wave was begun by Don Kates’ 1983 article in Michigan Law 
Review,248 which exposed their findings to a larger audience.  Over the following 
decade, the individual right view of the Second Amendment secured the 
endorsement of established constitutional scholars, including Sanford Levinson,249 
William van Alstyne,250 Akhil Amar,251 Leonard Levy,252 Larry Tribe,253 as well as 
rising stars such as Randy Barnett,254 Glenn Harlan Reynolds,255 Robert Cottrol,256 
and Eugene Volokh.257  In 1983, Joyce Lee Malcolm would aptly describe the then-
current understanding of the Second Amendment as “historical amnesia.”258  A 
dozen years later, Glenn Harlan Reynolds would describe the individual rights view 
as the “Standard Model” of the Amendment.259 
That left defenders of militia-use-only theories with one last refuge: the federal 
case law that had arisen during the period of historical amnesia.  For example: “An 
extraordinarily consistent body of case law has held that a variety of restrictions on 
private firearms ownership, use, and sales do not violate the Second Amendment, 
because such restrictions have no effect on the maintenance of a well-regulated 
militia—the National Guard.”260  The third and final wave of Second Amendment 
renaissance came as the individual rights view secured acceptance in the courts.  
This stage began with United States v. Emerson,261 where the Fifth Circuit 
recognized an individual right to arms, and culminated in the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
From the viewpoint of a court in 2001, it might seem that the meaning of the 
Second Amendment was well settled; it related only to service in an organized State 
militia.  In reality, that view had dominated the federal courts only for about three 
decades, and had been subject to serious criticism even during this brief lifespan. 
The period of the Framing had seen the evolution of two competing ideas for 
bills of rights – a recognition of the militia system, and a guarantee of an individual 
right to arms.  The two were not merged until the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 
1788.  Thereafter, of the two, the individual right to arms was seen as dominant, as 
documented by Madison’s writings, his original organization of the Bill of Rights, 
and the actions of the First Senate in rejecting both a right to arms “for the common 
defense” and amendments which would have expressly protected State power over 
the militia. 
These understandings were confirmed by the early constitutional commentators, 
and by early American courts.  The militia-uses-only view was represented by one 
minor exception in each case. 
By the time of the Civil War, the individual right view was accepted by 
abolitionists and by Justice Taney, by Republican and Democratic national platforms 
alike; in postwar years the Reconstruction Congresses, the courts, and the major 
legal commentators took the same approach, as did (with a single exception) early 
20th century courts. 
To a casual observer in the early 21st century it might seem that the militia-
uses—only view of the Second Amendment had always been predominant, and the 
Heller and McDonald involved dramatic legal change.  In full historical context, 
however, it becomes apparent that those decisions recognize the individual rights 
understanding that had prevailed from the Framing onward.  The militia-uses-only 
approach rejected in Heller and McDonald was in fact a very recent creation of the 
lower federal courts, utterly ahistoric, and which had been subject to scholarly 
challenge almost from its outset. 
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